In this paper we use a private dataset to examine the contribution and investment decisions made by members of a large UK-based DC pension plan. We find that many employees appear to be relatively financially-sophisticated and follow approaches consistent with economic and financial theory in terms of savings rates and investment strategies. However, there are also many less sophisticated employees who stick with plan default arrangements and/or follow simple rules of thumb in saving and investing. The challenge for corporate sponsors of pension funds is in designing pension plans and communication strategies that reduce the chances of these less sophisticated plan members making mistakes. The results in this paper highlight the areas where mistakes are made and the demographic profile of members most in need of help.
Introduction
Defined contribution (DC) pension plans are becoming increasingly common in many countries including the US and the UK. Individuals with DC plans have to make complex saving and investment decisions which may have significant welfare implications for them.
DC plans typically give individual plan members responsibility for deciding how much to contribute to the plan and how to invest these contributions. The evidence to date (see, for
example Byrne [2004] and Mitchell and Utkus [2004] for reviews) indicates that there are wide divergences from the behaviour expected if plan members were fully rational and made optimal savings and investment decisions over their life cycle (see, e.g., Campbell and Viceira, 2002, and Gomes and Michaelides, 2005) .
In this paper we use a private administrative dataset to examine the contribution and investment decisions made by members of one large UK-based DC plan which is sponsored by a FTSE-100 company. The company wishes to remain anonymous, but we can say that the workforce spans a broad range of skill and education levels with activities ranging from manufacturing through to research and development, and that the company does not operate in the financial services industry. The company is committed to providing good pension benefits for its employees and actively communicates with its workforce on pension issues.
The data allow us to test key rational and behavioural economic theories that relate to retirement saving. In broad terms, we find that many members appear to be relatively financially sophisticated and make decisions consistent with rational theory. However, there are also many employees who stick with scheme default arrangements and/or appear to use simple rules of thumb in their saving and investment decisions.
We find that the members' contribution rates are positively related to their age and level of income, which, contrary to much of the recent evidence from behavioural studies, is broadly consistent with lifecycle saving theory. We also find that male plan members save more than females, and that individuals who have made an active choice of investment fund save more than those who have accepted the default fund. The latter finding might be consistent with the idea that more financially sophisticated members save at higher rates, since they are more aware of the consequences of inadequate pension savings for the standard of living in old age.
Contrary to the proposition that conservative investors who adopt lower risk / lower expected return investment strategies need to save more to reach a given level of retirement income, we find that investors choosing equity-dominated investment funds actually save more than investors choosing fixed-income-dominated-funds. This might be because equity-dominated investors are more financially sophisticated investors and hence have a better understanding of their lifecycle needs.
In terms of investment choice, one particular contribution we are able to make is to assess member decision making in the absence of the complication of members being able to invest their contributions in the employer's own stock (see Agnew, 2006) , as this is not an option in this plan. This is important because own-employer stock is not a common investment choice in DC pension plans outside of the US. We find that use of the default fund declines with both employment tenure and income. Default fund use increases with age which may be because the default in this case comprises largely fixed-income investments. After controlling for whether or not the plan member has made an active choice of investment fund, we find that equity allocation decreases with age (by 5 percentage points for every 10-year increase in age), is higher for males than females (by approximately 9 percentage points) and increases with income (2 percentage points more for a salary of £40,000 relative to £30,000). There is some evidence of home bias in members' asset allocation, but this is less marked than documented elsewhere and is lower amongst investors with complex portfolios. Very few plan members appear to follow the naïve 1/n diversification approach documented by Benartzi and Thaler (2001) whereby members invest equally across all available investment funds. However, there is some evidence of a minority of members following a conditional 1/n diversification strategy (Huberman and Jiang, 2006) whereby contributions are invested equally across the subset of funds chosen by the member.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the previous academic literature on contribution and investment decisions in DC pension plans, including relevant literature from the field of behavioural economics. Section 3 describes the dataset we use in our analysis, while Section 4 outlines the method of analysis. Section 5 presents our results, and Section 6 concludes.
Literature

Contribution Decisions
Standard economic theory provides an explanation for the savings rates that individuals should choose throughout their working life if they are behaving optimally. The lifecycle saving theory of Ando, Brumberg and Modigliani (Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954; Ando and Modigliani, 1957) , and Friedman's permanent income hypothesis (1957) both imply that individuals attempt to smooth consumption over their lifetime in order to maximise expected lifetime utility. In essence, in each period an individual can consume up to the annuity value of his or her expected total (i.e., financial and human) wealth, and saving will take place only when current income exceeds this annuity value.
Behavioural economics provides an alternative view that suggests saving decisions may be driven by behavioural biases and thus may not be consistent with optimal behaviour. Previous research shows that a large proportion, and often the majority, of employees are inclined to take the 'path of least resistance' and passively adopt the default arrangements that exist in their pension plan. For example, Choi et al. (2002) review US evidence on the tendency for members to accept plan defaults for key features such as the contribution rate and the investment fund. Even though employees are free to opt out of default arrangements, relatively few actually do. In the plans Choi et al. studied, between 42% and 71% of participants accept the default contribution rate, even though it is typically too low to generate a reasonable replacement rate for retirement income. Huberman et al (2007) show that participation and saving rates rise with employee compensation and that women save more than men. They also find that plan participation is positively influenced by the presences of an employer contribution match and by the availability of employer stock as an investment option.
Investment Decisions
A similar analysis applies for members' investment choices: standard theory offers rational optimising explanations of choice, while behavioural finance offers alternative explanations driven by the existence of behavioural biases. Standard theory suggests that members choose an investment strategy to maximise their expected lifetime utility. This, in essence, involves maximising expected risk-adjusted portfolio returns, where the risk adjustment factor is the ratio of the volatility (i.e., standard deviation) of the portfolio returns to the investor's degree of risk tolerance.
1 While risk tolerance is essentially unobservable, psychometric questionnaires have been designed to attempt to measure it. Hallahan et al. (2004) A number of other studies document potentially non-rational approaches to portfolio strategy amongst DC pension plan members. For example, Benartzi and Thaler (2001) find DC members use a 1/n naïve diversification heuristic, whereby they split their pension contributions equally amongst the funds on offer. Huberman and Jiang (2006) counter argue that many members equally weight across the subset of funds they have chosen, but do not necessarily equally weight over all available choices, especially where 'n' is large. Agnew et al. (2003) find that equity allocations in DC plans are higher for males and rise with income and fall with age. Plan members make few changes through time in their asset holdings. Furthermore, Agnew (2006) finds that higher paid employees make better choices, being more likely to join the pension plan, holding less in company stock, and being less likely to invest using the 1/n approach.
Data
The dataset we use is generated from the records of the DC pension plan of a UK FTSE-100 listed company. The data relate to the period of 12 months up to May 2006 and include information on 3629 plan members. This represents all of the DC plan members with more than one year's service and who are not in addition accruing benefits under the company's defined benefit pension plan.
The dataset contains details on the contribution and investment decisions made by the pension plan members, including their chosen contribution rate, investment fund choice, and any fund switches they have made. The company runs a flexible benefits ("flex") plan whereby employees can choose the benefits most appropriate to them. The flex plan allows members to choose pension contributions of between 4% and 12% of salary that will be made out of the member's flex allowance. The amount of allowance not spent on pension contributions can be used to purchase non-pension benefits or be taken as additional cash salary. Plan members allocating 12% from their flex allowance to pension contributions can contribute up to an additional 6% of pre-tax salary to the plan and this attracts one-for-one matching from the company.
In terms of investment, members have a choice of 11 funds (four active equity funds; four passive equity funds; two bond funds; one cash fund). The plan operates a default fund for members who are reluctant to make their own choice of investment fund. The default asset allocation for members contributing 10% of salary or less to the plan is 100% index-linked bonds. Where a member is contributing more than 10% of salary to the plan, the default allocation is 100% index-linked bonds for the first 10% of salary and 100% equities for the remainder. 2 We have data on both the allocation of contributions chosen by members and the asset allocation of the portfolio, with the latter being the result of the allocation of contributions and the relative performance of the various funds over the period of investment.
In addition, the dataset includes demographic variables (age and sex) and employment variables (tenure and salary). These variables allow us to analyse cross-sectional differences in contribution and investment decisions across plan members. Table 1 provides the definitions of the variables used in this study.
[ Table 1 about here] Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the data. The average member is contributing 9.3% of salary, which includes the contributions made on behalf of the member by the employer.
Sixty-nine percent of members have made an active choice of how to invest their contributions, which is relatively high by comparison to evidence available on other plans (e.g. Choi et al., 2002) . However, members are relatively inactive, with the average number of fund switches made in the 12-month period being 0.37. In fact, only 4.7% of members made any switches during the period. The average member has chosen a contribution asset allocation of approximately 60% equities and 40% bonds, although there is a wide range and some members have an allocation of 100% bonds, while others have an allocation of 100% equities. The average 12 month portfolio return is 16.1% reflecting a period when equity markets did well. The average member is 35 years old, is paid £33,000 per annum and has been in the DC plan for 3.6 years. Forty six percent of plan members are males.
[ Table 2 about here]
Method
Hypotheses concerning contribution rates
Older employees are likely to have paid off (mortgage) debt and face reducing costs of bringing up their families, implying increased income available for saving for retirement.
Equally, higher-paid members should have greater amounts available for saving. We thus hypothesise, in line with lifecycle theory, that the saving rate of plan members will be a positive function of both age and income. The main weakness in our ability to test this is that
we know only what the member is contributing to their pension plan and cannot track nonpension saving. However, given the tax advantages of pension saving and the presence of employer matching it makes sense for employees who have already built up some precautionary savings to take full advantage of pension saving before saving more through other channels.
The expected relationship between the member's sex and pension contribution rate is somewhat ambiguous. Females typically have longer life expectancy than males and often also have interrupted careers. These factors would suggest the need for females to save more than males when they are in work. However, to the extent that males occupy 'breadwinner' roles in households, males may feel a greater need to provide for their family in retirement. Choi et al. (2002) document a default bias in the choices of DC pension plan members as regards contribution levels and investment choice. It is likely that engaged, active members who take an interest in their retirement savings will choose an appropriate contribution raterather than default or minimal levels -and choose an appropriate investment strategy rather than accept the default fund. It follows from this that there should be a positive relationship between the contribution rate and making an active fund choice.
Finally, the amount each member saves should be related to their desired level of pension in retirement. Plan members vary in the asset allocation chosen for their contributions. Given that equities have a higher expected return than bonds, it follows that, other things being equal, equity investors need to save less, on average, than bond investors. We thus expect a negative relationship between the contribution rate and the allocation of contributions to equities.
Putting these conjectures together leads to us to test the following regression:
( The variable definitions are as given in Table 1 . We estimate the regression using a Tobit approach.
3 3 ChoiceDummy and EquitiesFlow are potentially endogenous regressors in equation (1) given that they are decisions made by the plan member at the same point in time as the decision on SaveRate. However, in practice the correlations between Choice Dummy and Equities Flow and the residuals from the OLS estimation of equation (1) are practically zero. Furthermore, our attempts to produce instruments for ChoiceDummy and Choi et al.'s (2002) default bias implies that many members will passively accept the plan's default investment fund rather than make an active investment choice of their own. Some members will make an active choice and it seems plausible that default fund use should be negatively related to tenure (as people eventually make a positive choice), income (as a proxy for education) and age (as a proxy for engagement, with older employees typically more interested in pensions than younger employees). Active fund choice may also be related to sex, e.g. due to higher levels of overconfidence amongst males (Barber and Odean, 1999) .
Hypotheses concerning investment choice
To test this, we run the following Logit regression: For members who make an active choice of investment, the asset allocation chosen should reflect the member's attitude to risk. Hallahan et al. (2004) find subjective risk tolerance to be higher amongst males, positively related to income and negatively related to age. This implies that members' equity allocations should be similarly related. Furthermore, the lifecycle investment approach of Bodie (2003) implies lower allocations to equities at older ages.
To test this we run the following regression using Tobit estimation: We estimate this model in two forms. In Model A we estimate for all members in our sample, but include ChoiceDummy as a control variable because for most members the default fund is 100% fixed income. Model B is estimated for only those members who have made an active choice of investment fund and hence there is no need for the ChoiceDummy control variable.
There are a total of 2499 plan members who have made an active investment choice. We use the allocation of contributions (i.e. "Flow") rather than allocations of account balances
EquitiesFlow using a matched pair approach failed to find a suitable highly correlated instrument for either variable.
because, as Huberman and Jiang note (2006, p769) , account balances reflect cumulative returns as well as past choices and there is evidence that few members rebalance portfolios to achieve target allocations.
Portfolio diversification represents another dimension on which members must make a choice. Members can diversify internationally as well as across asset classes. The funds on offer in the plan are diversified equity portfolios mostly with a regional focus, together with domestic fixed income and cash funds. A large literature exists showing that many investors display a home bias and maintain a surprisingly high proportion -often 80% or more -of their investments in securities listed in their own country, e.g. French and Poterba (1991) and Kang and Stultz (1997) . There have been attempts at rational explanations of this bias, for example due to information costs, but there are also behavioural explanations, such as familiarity bias (Huberman, 2001) . We examine the degree of home bias in both the plan members' equity allocations and in their total portfolio allocations. The latter is a somewhat imperfect measure, because members seeking cash or fixed income exposure only have access to UK-domiciled investments. We further seek to understand whether certain groups of employees are more or less prone to home bias than others, for example because of their degree of financial sophistication.
We test the following regression using Tobit estimation: HomeEquity is defined as the percentage of the member's equity exposure accounted for by domestic equity. We also estimate the equation for HomeAssets, which is defined as the percentage of the overall portfolio comprised domestic assets (equities, bonds and cash).
Again, we estimate this only for those scheme members who have made an active choice of
funds.
An additional consideration in terms of investment choice is that while members of the plan can choose their own asset allocation, they must do so from a set of 11 funds offered in the plan. An important question is how members diversify across the key asset classes (especially equities and bonds) using the funds offered and the influence the fund menu has on their decisions. Our data allow us to test for plan members using the naïve 1/n or the conditional 1/n approaches to diversification.
Testing for 1/n is simply a matter of examining what proportion of members invest in all 11
funds and how many of those do so in equal proportions. To test for the conditional 1/n approach, we follow the approach of Huberman and Jiang (2006) . They sort plan members by the number of funds they have chosen and then assess what proportion of members in each category is following a conditional 1/n strategy. To do so, they calculate the Herfindahl concentration index for each member's portfolio allocation, which is defined as the sum of the squared fractions of contributions to each fund. For example, the Herfindahl index for an investor who chooses two funds and puts 50% in each is 0.5 (i.e., 0.5 2 + 0.5 2 ). The Herfindahl index can range from 1/n through to 1. Huberman and Jiang argue that an investor is "close"
to following a 1/n strategy if the total deviation of their fund allocation from a pure 1/n strategy is no more than 20%. (In the two fund case this equates to a 55:45 allocation.) This allows them to calculate an upper bound for the Herfindahl index than can be interpreted as being consistent with the plan member following a conditional 1/n strategy. We adopt this approach in our analysis.
Our final test on investment choice is to examine the number of funds chosen by plan members. We have already sought to understand the determinants of equity allocation and home bias and there are likely to be interrelations between those decisions and decisions on the number of funds to hold. We run a regression that seeks to explain fund choice in terms of the demographic variables used previously: age, sex, and pay. Given that the number of funds is a count variable, we use Poisson regression to estimate the equation. Table 3 shows the regression models that we use to attempt to explain members' contribution rates. It is clear from both specifications of the model that contributions are positively related to age and income, which is broadly consistent with lifecycle saving theory. Other things being equal, the contribution rate is 1% higher for every ten year increase in member age. The income coefficients imply that contribution rates are on average 0.8% higher for an employee on a salary of £50,000 relative to an employee on £30,000. On average, males have a 1%
Results
Results concerning contribution rates
higher contribution rate than females, controlling for age and income.
[ Table 3 about here]
There is evidence that higher contribution rates are chosen by more 'engaged' members who also make an active choice of investment fund. These members save an additional two percentage points of salary compared with members who have not made an active investment choice. Our final contribution rate hypothesis was that members who take a conservative, fixed-income-based investment strategy would save more to compensate for the lower expected return on their portfolio. Panel B of Table 3 shows that the opposite appears to be the case, with fixed-income investors saving less than equity investors. 4 Other things being equal, a member 100% invested in equities saves an additional 3% of salary relative to a member 100% invested in bonds. This might imply that both contribution rate and equity allocation are related to some measure of financial sophistication.
Results concerning investment choice
Our first analysis of investment choice seeks to understand the characteristics of members who make an active choice of investment strategy rather than accept the default fund. Table 4 shows the results of a Logit regression where the dependent variable is ChoiceDummy, which takes the value one if the member has made an active fund choice and zero otherwise.
[ Table 4 about here]
The results show that higher-paid members are more likely to make an investment choice, which may mean pay is acting as a proxy for education and financial sophistication. The probability of making a choice also increases with employment tenure, suggesting that some members initially accept the default but eventually get around to making an active choice. This is consistent with the findings of Choi et al. (2002) . Older members are more likely to use the default than younger members, holding tenure constant. Given that for most members (contributing less than 10% of salary), the default is 100% bonds, it may be that older members are more likely to regard this asset allocation as suitable for their needs than younger members who may desire higher return investments. The sex variable in the equation is insignificant. We re-estimate the equation excluding the sex variable and find that the coefficients for the other variables are largely unchanged.
The most significant investment choice plan members have to make is the proportion of their contributions to invest in equity funds. Table 5 shows the analysis of this decision. Model A shows the results for the full sample using ChoiceDummy as a control to account for the default fund being 100% fixed income for most members. Model B is estimated for only those members who have made an active choice of investment fund.
[ Table 5 about here]
The coefficients for both models are qualitatively similar. Both models show that older members invest less in equities than younger members, consistent with lifecycle asset allocation. Taking Model B, for every ten year increase in member age, the equity allocation is 11 percentage points lower. The coefficient is lower for Model A. Other things being equal, equity allocation is higher for males than females (by 9 percentage points) and higher for those on higher incomes. The equity allocation of an employee with a £40,000 salary is approximately two percentage points higher than that of an employee on £30,000. These results are consistent with Hallahan et al.'s (2004) analysis of subjective risk tolerance scores and with Agnew et al.'s (2003) analysis of one large US DC plan.
In addition to choosing an allocation to equity, members may choose the international diversification of their portfolio. Across the whole sample, members allocate an average of 63% of their portfolios to domestic assets, and an average of 40% of their equity portfolios to domestic equity funds. While this is an indication of home bias, it appears to be less extreme than found in many previous studies. Taking only those members who have made an active choice of investment funds, the corresponding domestic weights are 48% of total assets and 38% of equity assets.
[ Table 6 about here] Table 6 shows the results of a regression equation attempting to explain which members are most prone to home bias. Panel A examines the domestic share of the equity portfolio, while
Panel B examines the share of total assets. The main point to note is that in both cases the explanatory power of the model is low. However, both specifications show that older members are inclined to hold more home biased portfolios (for example two percentage points more domestic equity for every 10 years of age), while males hold less home biased portfolios. Care should be taken in interpreting the model in Panel B in that the only fixed income and cash funds in the plan are domestic funds. Hence, any investor desiring a conservative portfolio allocation must, by default, accept a degree of home bias.
One question that arises from the foregoing analysis of equity allocation and home bias is the extent to which both are determined by the level of financial sophistication of the investor.
The data shown in Table 7 suggest this is the case. The table shows data ranked into quintiles by number of funds held in each member's portfolio. High numbers of funds are more likely to be complex portfolios held by relatively sophisticated investors. The Table provides [ Table 7 about here]
To continue the analysis of diversification, Table 8 Thaler's 1/n rule is not a valid description of the members' behaviour.
[ Table 8 is a number that is easy to divide by. In total, just over 14% of plan members follow a strategy that is close to the conditional 1/n approach using Huberman and Jiang's definition.
It is important to note, as Huberman and Jiang do in their analysis, that these results say nothing of the rationality of the individual fund choices. A 50:50 allocation between two of the funds on offer in this plan might well be an optimal choice for a member with a particular risk tolerance.
Panel B of Table 8 nothing to say these allocations are not rational, but they are also consistent with members using simple heuristics when deciding on the contribution allocation.
We turn now to an attempt to explain the number of funds chosen by members to create their portfolio. Taking the number of funds held as a proxy for portfolio complexity, the results in Table 9 show that older members choose simpler portfolios, while higher paid members choose more complex ones. There is no significant relationship between portfolio complexity and sex.
[ Table 9 about here]
Conclusions
In this paper, we have used a private administrative dataset to examine the contribution and investment decisions made by members of a large UK-based DC plan which is sponsored by a FTSE-100 company. We find a number of aspects of decision making by members that appear to reflect rational approaches and financial sophistication. For example, there is evidence of lifecycle saving patterns in contribution rates and asset allocation varying with age in a manner consistent with lifecycle investing. However, we also find evidence consistent with behavioural bias and potentially irrational approaches. For example, relatively high use of the default fund, home bias, and some evidence of conditional 1/n diversification approaches.
The recent literature on individual financial decision making over the lifecycle has emphasised the effect of behavioural biases in decision making. There is evidence that some members of this plan are prone to these behavioural biases, especially when it comes to the active management of their portfolios. However, we also find that a large percentage of the plan's membership behave according to the predictions of standard lifecycle saving theory and lifecycle asset allocation. One speculation is that this might be a result, at least partially, of the effectiveness of the company's pensions communications strategy. While we are unable to test this directly, we can conjecture that a reasonably good pensions communications strategy would be more effective at communicating the importance of saving for retirement than with getting across the message of efficient risk diversification. This is what we find here. As a consequence, the members of this pension scheme are much closer to being rational lifecycle optimisers than many other recent studies have found.
The analysis in this paper provides a starting point for company management considering the focus of pensions-related communications for the workforce, in terms of topic area and in terms of the demographic profile of employees most in need of guidance. % concordant = 61.5 % concordant = 61.5
Dependent variable is ChoiceDummy, a zero-one dummy variable that takes the value one if the member has made an active choice of investment fund and zero if the member is invested only in the default fund. Independent variables as described in Table 1 . See equation (2) in the text. The dependent variable in Panel A is HomeEquity, which is the percentage of the members equity portfolio invested in domestic equity funds. The dependent variable in Panel B is HomeAssets, which is the percentage of the members portfolio invested in all domestic assets. Independent variables as defined in Table 1 . See equation (9) in the text. The equation is estimated using only those members of the plan who have made an active choice of funds. Zstatistics based on Huber/White adjusted standard errors. In Panel A Number of Funds Chosen is the number of funds to which the member has a non-zero allocation of contributions. The Percentage of Members is based only on those members who have made an active choice of investment funds. H is the value of the Herfindahl index that is consistent with an allocation of contributions of 1/n, where n is the number of funds chosen. H U is the upper bound of the Herfindahl index that is consistent with an allocation of contributions that deviates by no more than 20% from a conditional 1/n strategy. In Panel B, the analysis considers only members who have chosen just two funds. Other Splits contains all members who chose splits other than the 'round' numbers shown in the Table. No other individual split accounts for more than 0.8% of members. 
